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1 Introduction
One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results from Mech-
anism Design and Implementation Theory is the effective enforcement of theoreti-
cally established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented.
A short reflection on what is going wrong on our planet in terms of environ-
mental, political and human disasters will result into the insight to the necessity of
intelligent social design of enforceable cooperation based structures.
One of the pillars of such “social design” that had been termed genuine imple-
mentation in several articles by the late Leo Hurwicz is the possibility of enforce-
ment.
In his “Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz”,
that was presented at the North American Meeting of the Econometric Society on
June 22, 2006 and published in Review of Economic Design (2009, vol. 13, pp. 1-2),
Roger Myerson starts the abstract by writing:
“We follow Hurwicz in considering fundamental questions about social institutions.”
In section 6 of this article Myerson discusses mechanisms formalized as game
forms and the way Hurwicz (2008) proposed to approach the enforcement problem
via distinguishing legal games from true games.
In our present note we discuss Hurwicz’s concept of enforcement and Myerson’s
proposed modification and compare them with the concept of a social system that
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had been introduced by Gerard Debreu (Debreu (1952)) also known as abstract
economy or generalized game.
2 Enforcement
Section 8 of Hurwicz (2008) begins with the passage:
“A need for enforcement implies the possibility of behavior that violates the rules of the
game. The point is that if there were no possibility of violation, then you wouldn’t need
enforcement. We refer to such strategies as illegal, as distinct from legal, of course.”
Later we find:
“To say that the legal game rules are being successfully enforced means that the outcomes
of the true game ensure that illegal strategies are less attractive than legal strategies. A
strong formulation of successful enforcement might require that, for every player, every
illegal strategy is dominated by (that is, is less attractive than) some legal strategy. A ‘weak’
domination would require only that a player at least be no worse off by staying within the
law. In fact, however, if everyone else is acting illegally, a normally law-abiding player
may not find it advantageous to remain law-abiding. It seems, therefore, more reasonable to
adopt a somewhat weaker concept of successful enforcement.”
Referring to this passage, (Myerson, 2009, pp. 67,68) writes:2
“Hurwicz (1998) explains that, if our legal game G = (N,(Ci)i∈N ,(Ui)i∈N) is embedded in
some true game H, the structural relationship must be that H = (N,(Di)i∈N ,(Ui)i∈N) has a
larger strategy spaces
Di ⊃Ci ∀i ∈ N
and has utility functions that extend those of the legal game G to the larger domain D =
× j∈ND j . Hurwicz (1998) then suggests that a strong formulation of successful enforcement
could require that, for each player i, each illegal strategy outside Ci should be dominated
by some legal strategy in Ci, so that a player’s best responses always take him into the legal
game, even if others deviate.
Hurwicz (2008) remarks, however, that a normally law-abiding player might not want to
remain law-abiding when others are acting illegally, and so a weaker concept of enforcement
may be appropriate. Thus, I would suggest that the definition of institutional enforcement
should be weakened, to say that G is enforceable in H when
∀i ∈ N,∀c−i ∈ × j∈N−iC j,∀di ∈ Di \Ci,∃ci ∈Ci such that Ui(c−i,ci)>Ui(c−i,di),
so that each players optimal actions are in his legal strategy set when all other actions are
expected to be in their legal sets. That is, G is enforceable when its strategy sets form a
curb set in H, as defined by Basu and Weibull (1991). (Curb sets are closed under rational
behavior.)”
Strictly speaking, the relation between Myerson’s definition of enforceability and
the curb sets of Basu and Weibull (1991) is more subtle. In contrast to their defini-
tion that is based on mixed strategy profiles interpreted as players’ beliefs about
2 An earlier version of Hurwicz’s Nobel prize lecture (Hurwicz, 2008) appeared in 1998 as working
paper at the University of Minnesota.
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which pure strategies in compact strategy sets of the other players will be played
and that thereby makes use of expected utilities there are no “expectations” in the
less specific framework or in the definitions used by Hurwicz (2008) and Myerson
(2009). The sentence “so that each player’s optimal actions are in his legal strategy
set when all others’ actions are expected to be in their legal sets” used by Myerson
adequately describes the situation in the model of Basu and Weibull (1991), but it is
meaningless in his context and should be modified as follows in order to fit the pure
strategy framework.
The argument in favor of a weaker definition of enforceability used by Hurwicz
(2008) and followed by Myerson by his suggestion of the modified definition above
does not completely convince us.
A designer’s attitude that accepts deviation from law-abiding behavior of an indi-
vidual provided the others act illegally, would not be consistent with the central goal
of a mechanism to regulate activities in a society by restricting the sets of accept-
able actions via unattractive payoffs. Such a weak enforcement fails, for instance,
in cases of coordination of the players on a more advantageous illegal equilibrium.
Only the trust of everybody in punishment of each single individual that deviates
from legal behavior creates confidence in the effectiveness of the mechanism.
A weakness that we feel to be common to either of the above definitions of en-
forcement is the fact that it is totally determined on the mechanism side rather than
also depending on the individuals’ preferences as reflecting the respective society’s
values, customs and norms.
We shall deal with this aspect in the next section.
3 Social systems
Debreu (1952) introduced the notion of a social system in the first paragraph of
his seminal article “A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem” and used this no-
tion again on page 397 of his Nobel Memorial Lecture on “Economic Theory in
the Mathematical Mode” (Debreu (1984)). The fact that in this purely mathematical
analysis, references to Economics and Game Theory are made only in four foot-
notes may have been causal for the now prevailing habit in the related literature of
denoting a social system as a generalized game or an abstract economy (e.g., Shafer
and Sonnenschein (1975), Tian (1990), Tian and Zhou (1992)). In particular in the
Operations Research literature the problem of existence of equilibria in social sys-
tems has become popular under the name generalized Nash equilibrium problem
(GNEP). Facchinei and Kanzow (2010) write:
“As we already mentioned, many researchers from different fields worked on the GNEP, and
this explains why this problem has a number of different names in the literature including
pseudo-game, social equilibrium problem, equilibrium programming, coupled constraint
equilibrium problem, and abstract economy. We will stick to the term generalized Nash
equilibrium problem that seems the favorite one by OR researchers in recent years.”
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They do not cite Debreu (1952) in their references but at least refer to Arrow and
Debreu (1954), where the Equilibrium Existence Theorem of Debreu (1952) was
first applied in Economics.
In sociology, where generalized games recently have gained some popularity,
their origins in Debreu (1952) seem to have remained widely unnoticed (cf. Burns
and Roszkowska (2005)).
In this note we want to stress the relevance that Debreu’s modeling of a social
system may have in an agenda of social and institutional design as propagated in
the work of the late Leo Hurwicz. Accordingly, we will introduce Debreu’s social
system adding at the same time a way of interpreting it under the aspects of genuine
implementation and enforcement as discussed in our first two sections.
In Debreu (1952) a social system S is defined as
S= (N,(Di)i∈N ,(Ui)i∈N ,(βi)i∈N)
The correspondence βi from D−i :=× j∈N−iD j to Di associates with each action
profile d−i ∈D−i the set of all those actions of individual i in Di that are unanimously
declared legal by the individuals j ∈ N−i via the joint choice of the action profile
d−i. The correspondence β from D to D is defined by β (d) :=×i∈Nβi(d−i).
This definition does not exclude the possibility that the mechanism declares ad-
ditional actions or action profiles illegal. An action di is illegal per se, if it is not
contained in βi(d−i) for any d−i ∈ D−i. We will not include this possibility, how-
ever, in our present considerations.
Debreu distinguished between actions and choices of agents i ∈ N from the sets
Di and βi(d−i), respectively. We interpret here his actions as corresponding to strate-
gies in Hurwicz’s true game and choices as strategies in legal action profiles: An
action profile is legal if it is a choice profile, i.e. if each agent’s action in the profile
is confirmed by the actions of all others in the profile.
Notice that in contrast to Hurwicz we do not have a legal game whose extension
is the true game! Our set of legal action profiles need not have a product structure.
So legality of an action is always contingent on all other agent’s actions.
To illustrate this point, consider the scenario, in which a committee has to take
an ethically difficult decision. Each member can take the actions to “join” or “stay
away” from the committee meeting. The decision can only be taken, if half of the
members choose “join”. As the decision has to be taken, illegal action profiles are
only those, in which more than one half of the individuals choose to stay away.
Phrased differently, a single individual choosing “stay away” need not mean that
the action profile itself is illegal, although everyone choosing to stay away should
certainly be called an illegal action profile.
Any product of subsets of the players’ action sets, however, that builds a set of
legal action profiles would define a legal subgame game of the true game.
The similarity to curb sets is obvious but neither is such a legal game necessarily
a curb set nor vice versa.The difference lies in the fact that legality in our context
has nothing to do with rationality. The latter will enter when we start considering
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equilibria of legal games,an intention behind Hurwicz’s idea of genuine implemen-
tation.
A detailed study of these relations could contribute a solid edifice of enforcement
and social mechanism design.
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